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KOREA'S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION: AN OVERVIEW
AND ASSESSMENT
Kim Dong-Choon*
INTRODUCTION
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Korea (hereinafter
"TRCK") was established in 2005 by the South Korean National Assembly
as an independent body to investigate human rights violations in Korea
from 1910 through 1987, including massacres, incidents of death, injury or
disappearance, politically fabricated trials, and the killing of unarmed civil-
ians and political prisoners before and during the Korean War. Created by
the Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconcilia-
tion,' the TRCK is a product of South Korea's decades-long democratiza-
tion movement and the liberal government it produced. 2 Its findings and
recommendations may accordingly be seen as a tool for breaking open the
politics of denial that have been maintained in South Korea for the past
sixty years. At the same time, its work can help to set straight the distorted
history of South Korea and to rewrite the Northeast Asian Cold War his-
tory. The TRCK's work thus not only clarifies important aspects of Korea's
past and its interconnections with neighboring big powers, but likewise has
implications for Korea's future reunification and for the maintenance of
peaceful relations in Northeast Asia.
The TRCK's effectiveness was nevertheless significantly hampered by
a number of factors, including its limited legal authority, firm resistance
from entrenched and defensive government bureaucracies, and continuous
contestation from conservative political forces. It was likewise faced with
* Professor of Sociology, Sungkonghoe University (Korea). Professor Kim served
as a Standing Commissioner of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea,
Republic of Korea (TRCK) from its establishment in December 2005 until December
2009, one year prior to its close in December 2010. The author thanks Tara Melish,
Mark Nathan and Errol Meidinger for their careful editorial review of this article.
1. The Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconciliation,
Act. No. 7542, May 31, 2005 [hereinafter Framework Act], translation available at
http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/Informationlegal/read.asp?num=76&pageno=l &stype=
&sval=&data.years=2012&data_month=.
2. See Kim Dong-Choon, The Long Road Toward Truth and Reconciliation, 42
CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 525 (2010) (tracing the genealogy of the TRCK and victim-
centered activism for redressing the past back to the 1960s, while recognizing that full-
fledged activism started only in 1987 after the demise of military rule).
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the steady ascendance of the neo-liberal economic discourse over the
human rights discourse over its lifetime, the latter having provided the so-
cial foundations for the TRCK's emergence in the first place. As a conse-
quence, while the TRCK was able to document many historical cases of
human rights abuse, it was not able to document adequately the conditions
that led to those abuses or to facilitate true reconciliation among the many
segments of Korean society that both carried out and suffered those abuses.
This Article provides an overview of the TRCK's work and its recom-
mendations as well as an assessment of its accomplishments and the signifi-
cant road that lies ahead in ensuring the full implementation of the TRCK's
historic recommendations. Part I describes the TRCK's genesis, social con-
text, and mandate, while Part II analyzes its statutory powers and what I
view as the limitations built into its jurisdictional authority. Parts III and IV
then turn to the TRCK's actual work. Part III describes the Commission's
achievements and the specific recommendations it issued to the government
and government institutions. Part IV then assesses the record of, and pros-
pects for, the implementation of those recommendations. The Article con-
cludes with lessons learned from the TRCK experience and an enumeration
of specific measures the South Korean government will need to take to
ensure the TRCK's efforts meet with lasting success.
I. GENESIS AND MANDATE
The TRCK's genesis can be traced to two primary developments in
Korea. On the one hand, it can be seen as the outcome of the long struggle
for justice that Korea's democratization movements and civil society have
strenuously waged for decades. That process began in the 1960s, reaching
maturity in the late 1980s with democratic elections and the demise of mili-
tary rule. Unlike other truth commissions in post-dictatorship countries, it
was nevertheless not until the democratic transition was largely consoli-
dated in 2005 that the TRCK was established. Pressed by civil society activ-
ists, the Korean government only then sought to address questions of long-
delayed justice.
On the other hand, the TRCK was the first comprehensive truth com-
mission in South Korea and in Northeast Asia more generally. The neces-
sity of a commission mandated to address the full range of past human
rights violations, not just particular incidents, became apparent after several
narrower efforts to deal with separate past incidents had been attempted.
The TRCK thus built on several earlier laws. In particular, over the opposi-
tion of right-wing forces, Korea's civilian governments under Presidents
Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) and Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) passed a
number of special laws between 1995 and 2000 to settle certain unresolved
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historical cases. These included the Gwangju Special Act of 1995, which
focused on punishing former military leaders who killed civilians in
Gwangju in 1980, 3 and the Guchang Special Act of 1996, which aimed to
restore the honor of civilian victims massacred in 1951. 4 These specialized
laws were followed in 2000 by the Jeju 4.3 Special Act for Investigating the
Jeju April 3 Incident and Recovering the Honor of Victims 5 as well as the
establishment that same year of the Presidential Truth Commission on Sus-
picious Deaths of the Republic of Korea (PTCSD). 6 The creation of this
latter Commission was an important step toward the settling of human
rights violations under military rule.7
Yet, the limited nature of these historical inquiries raised dilemmas for
both the Roh Moo-hyun government and civil rights activists. In particular,
they were concerned that if the numerous past incidents of human rights
abuse were settled individually, many individual laws would have to be
legislated and victims could demand increasingly expansive settlements,
triggering a never-ending process of expanding reparations packages de-
pending on the special law created to investigate the incident at issue. They
therefore concluded that a better alternative was to pursue one single corn-
3. Special Act Concerning the 18 May Democratization Movement, Act. No.
5029, Dec. 21, 1995. On August 25, 1995, 30,565 professors from seventy-eight univer-
sities signed the petition demanding the special law. At the same time, members of 300
trade unions marched in Seoul demanding justice for Gwangju. By November, more
than 700,000 signatures were gathered. On November 24, 1995 Kim Young-sam or-
dered the special law to be drafted.
4. Special Measures Act for Recovering the Dignity of the Victims of Guchang
and other Incidents, Act. No. 5148, Jan. 15, 1996.
5. The Jeju April 3 Incident was a series of events in which thousands of islanders
were killed as a result of clashes between guerilla and government forces. The Jeju
branch of the South Korean Labor Party organized uprisings against the American-
sponsored Rhee Syngman groups. They began protesting the general election that the
divided government would be built on in 1948. Confronted with a government suppres-
sion policy, the guerrillas were forced to hide on Halla Mountain. During the suppres-
sion operations, nearly thirty-thousand civilians were known to have been killed by the
National Police, Northwest Youth, and National Guard. Since the incident occurred
during the U.S. military government's occupation, this operation, which resulted in nu-
merous civilian deaths, was conducted under the sponsorship of U.S. forces. See
Hunjoon Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years: The National Committee for Investigation
of the Truth about the Jeju 4.3 Events, 3 INT'L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 406-423
(2009).
6. The Commission was established in the Special Act to Find the Truth on Suspi-
cious Deaths, Act. No. 6123, Jan. 12, 2000.
7. A more complete list of key events can be found in TRUTH AND RECONCILIA-
TION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION: ACTIVITIES OF
THE PAST THREE YEARS 10-12 (2009) [hereinafter TRCK 2009 REPORT].
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prehensive settlement. On August 15, 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun spoke
of the necessity for such a comprehensive past settlement, which in turn
encouraged activists and bereaved family members to campaign for such
legislation.8
The resulting Framework Act established the TRCK with a broad pur-
pose and expansive investigatory mandate. Its purpose was defined as fos-
tering national legitimacy and reconciling the past for the sake of national
unity, which it was to do by honoring those who had participated in anti-
Japanese movements and investigating human rights abuses from Japanese
colonialism to the present, especially during the nation's authoritarian re-
gimes.9 The investigative scope of the Commission was thus extremely
broad. It covered three broad areas representing three distinct historical pe-
riods: (1) anti-colonial movements during the Japanese occupation, (2) mas-
sacres before and during the Korean War, and (3) human rights abuses
during Korea's democratization period.' 0 This range of events, covering the
span of almost a century, might be the most extensive and wide-ranging
among the TRCs that have existed in the world.
The TRCK was accordingly given authority to investigate matters
within this mandate, to take decisions on such matters, and to recommend
8. For the full text of President Roh Moo-hyun's speech (in Korean), see No-cut
News, Aug. 15, 2004, available at http://media.daum.net/politics/others/newsview?
newsid=20040815121821746.
9. Framework Act, supra note 1, art. 1.
10. TRCK 2009 REPORT, supra note 7, at 5. A more detailed breakdown is in-
cluded in the Framework Act itself, which includes:
1. Anti-Japanese movements during the period of Japanese colonial rule starting
in 1910 and in the early years following Korea's liberation on August 15, 1945;
2. Efforts by exiled or overseas Koreans to uphold Korea's sovereignty and en-
hance Korea's national prestige from the Japanese occupation to the enforce-
ment date of this Act;
3. Massacres from August 15, 1945 to the Korean War;
4. Incidents of death, injury or disappearance, and other major acts of human
rights violations, including politically fabricated trials, committed through the
illegal or seriously unjust exercise of state power, such as the violation of the
constitutional order, from August 15, 1945 to the end of the authoritarian re-
gimes (1987);
5. Terrorist acts, human rights violations, violence, massacres and suspicious
deaths by parties that denied the legitimacy or were hostile towards the Repub-
lic of Korea from August 15, 1945 to the end of the authoritarian regimes
(1987);
6. Incidents that are historically important and incidents that the Commission
deems necessary.
Framework Act, supra note 1, art. 2.
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measures for promoting reconciliation.1" Its establishment signaled a dra-
matic change from the silence imposed by past anticommunist regimes in
South Korea, especially with regard to the mass killings committed by U.S.
forces as well as the South Korean police and military before and during the
Korean War. However, the TRCK was destined to face serious hurdles from
the very beginning due to the persistence of the Cold War in East Asia.
Indeed, the continued division of the Korean peninsula meant that South
Korea was still ruled by anticommunist governments, which had long re-
fused to admit the history of state violence against those accused of being
communists. Nonetheless, in terms of its objective to document and redress
the massacres and grave human right violations committed by the victims'
own government, the TRCK was the first effort of its kind in Northeast
Asia.
Like other TRCs established in different parts of the world during the
1990s, the TRCK selected a "truth-and-reconciliation model" for dealing
with past incidents, rather than a "punishment-and-compensation" ap-
proach. This was done primarily for political reasons given the Korean con-
text, even as some activists argued that a "punishment-and-compensation"
approach was needed to achieve justice. These activists were upset that the
TRCK was not granted the right to prosecute those who committed atroci-
ties. Rather, its legal mandate was limited to uncovering the truth for the
record, recommending corrections to textbooks and other records, and aid-
ing reconciliation through compensation or services for the victims.
The decision to pursue a "truth-and-reconciliation model" reflects a
number of factors. On one level, it reflects the fact that much of the
TRCK's work was to focus on verifying the truth of petitions filed with it
concerning incidents that took place over fifty years ago, particularly con-
cerning mass killings during the Korean War. Given that many witnesses
have already passed away and documentation has been destroyed, the possi-
bility of prosecuting perpetrators was remote. At the same time, alleged
perpetrators of killings had often already been honored as national heroes of
the Korean War; thus the very findings thereof and the victims' statements
contradicted official versions of the history of the Korean War. As a result,
the comprehensive past-dealing project of the Roh Moo-hyun government
and the civil activists adopted a politically acceptable strategy: the 'truth-
and-reconciliation' model, instead of the 'punishment-and-compensation'
model accepted in other political terrain.12
11. Framework Act, supra note 1, art. 3(2).
12. Sidestepping the issue of punishment and compensation has affected the inves-
tigations of the TRCK, raising doubts about whether truth can be achieved without
punishment.
2012]
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That decision also reflected the cumulative experience of numerous
past-dealing processes within South Korea, some of which had experi-
mented with compensation for victims. In particular, there had been an ex-
periment of reparatory justice when the South Korean government
compensated individual victims of the Gwangju Democratization Move-
ment, where several hundred civilians were killed by government troops in
May 1980. Although financial compensation had been seen as the most ef-
fective way to placate victims, many activists viewed it as a mere political
means for calming the dissatisfaction, not as means for serving justice. 13 In
this respect, while the title, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, was
seemingly adopted in light of the experience of TRCs like those of Chile
and South Africa, the TRCK's mandate and purpose are somewhat differ-
ent. This is especially so with regard to South Africa's TRC, in which indi-
vidual victim reparation was central and amnesty from prosecution was
offered only to those who fully testified about their participation in past
crimes before the TRC. 14
Although "reconciliation" is the second part of the TRCK's title, the
Framework Act did not specify how and with whom the TRCK is to pro-
mote reconciliation. 15 This has led the TRCK to focus on establishing truth
as a way to promote reconciliation, following the model of reconciliation
through truth. Given the existing government has stubbornly denied the
very existence of state-sponsored mass killings, torture and human rights
13. This sentiment was expressed not only by victims and activists of the Gwangju
Democratization movements, but also by Gwangju citizens in general, who tended to
view such measures as unacceptable and unjust. They believed that no reparatory mea-
sures could be executed in the absence of a truth-finding process. The bill designed by
the Roh Tae-woo government only vaguely defined the historical significance and pre-
cise timeframe of the incident, and it defined the beneficiaries of the bill as those who
were "related to" the Gwangju Democratization Movement without specifying what
"related to" meant. See Shin Il-sup, The Politico-social Meaning of Gwangju Compen-
sation Act, in 5.18 PEOPLES' RESISTANCE AND LEGAL STUDIES 173-204 (5.18 Memorial
Foundation ed., 2006).
14. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was a court-like
body assembled in South Africa after the abolition of apartheid. Witnesses who were
identified as victims of gross human rights violations were invited to give statements
about their experiences, and some were selected for public hearings. Perpetrators of
violence could also give testimony and request amnesty from both civil and criminal
prosecution. See generally TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AF-
RICA, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, vol. 1
(1998), http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report.
15. The Framework Act allows the Commission to recommend that immunity be
granted to perpetrators actively cooperating with the Commission by confessing his/her
crime during the investigation. See Framework Act, supra note 1, art. 38.
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violations in the name of anticommunism, settlement of the past, it was
concluded, should be accomplished primarily through fact-finding.
I. THE TRCK's WORK
A. Jurisdictional and Investigative Powers
The Commission was authorized to investigate petitions for four years,
with a possible two-year extension if needed.' 6 For the first the two years, it
functioned under the Roh administration, which had championed it. How-
ever, the election of the conservative politician Lee Myung-bak to the presi-
dency in 2008 shunted the discourse of justice and human rights, which had
come to be highly valued over two decades, and gave rise to one emphasiz-
ing efficiency and competitiveness. With this power shift, the TRCK found
itself in increasingly troubled waters.
The TRCK had a staff of about 240, including eighty-four seconded
from central and local governments. Its budget in 2008 was approximately
19.7 billion Korean won (or just over $14 million US), roughly half of
which went to personnel and half to operating expenses1 7 The TRCK was
composed of fifteen commissioners: eight recommended by the National
Assembly, four appointed by the President, and three nominated by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.' 8 Four of these fifteen commissioners
were designated standing commissioners (two recommended by the Na-
tional Assembly and two nominated by the President). This designation re-
ferred to their status as full-time bureaucrats at the level of deputy prime
minister in the Korean government. Their main role was to direct the inves-
tigations and preside over all affairs of the Commission, while one of them,
the chairperson, managed the Commission's Executive Office. Although
the TRCK could have requested a two year extension in its mandate,1 9 the
Commission ended its mission in December 2010, after its initial term ex-
pired and only a six-month renewal was requested by the Commission and
authorized by the conservative government of Lee Myong-bak.
Under the "Framework Act," the Commission was empowered to in-
vestigate incidents not only on its own authority, but also based on petitions
received from victims, victims' families and other concerned persons that
have specific facts regarding an issue to be investigated.20 Following the
16. Id. art. 25.
17. TRCK 2009 REPORT, supra note 7, at 15.
18. Framework Act, supra note 1, art. 4.
19. Id. art. 25.
20. Id. arts. 19, 22(3).
2012]
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year allowed for acceptance of such petitions,2 1 about ten thousand inci-
dents were finally filed for investigation, eighty percent of which were re-
lated to Korean War massacres.2 2 In investigating these incidents, the
Commission's staff investigators would review known written documenta-
tion and then look for related documents that were believed to be preserved
in police, military or Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) files.
Based on the survivors' statements and the documents that were obtained,
the investigators would reconstruct full stories of the incidents through
which the ruling narratives could be falsified or new facts could be built.
The draft of the investigators' report was then submitted to the Commission
for a decision.
In deciding whether to accept or reject a petition-related report, a ma-
jority of the fifteen commissioners would need to vote in favor of it.23 Ma-
jority decision-making was privileged over a deliberative process that might
promote consensus, and even within the Commission there was often a lack
of effort to seek reconciliation among the commissioners. Since the com-
missioners were appointed by the three separate branches of the govern-
ment and had either liberal or conservative backgrounds, their ability to
reach consensus was not as good as one might have wished.
The Commission could likewise decide to investigate some important
incidents on its own authority, provided it had sufficient support to admit it
as an "historically important event considered critical to identifying the
truth. '24 Nonetheless, because the Commission was given only four years
(with a possible two year extension if needed) to investigate the over 10,000
individual petitions submitted to it, it faced significant difficulties in pursu-
ing these other historically important incidents and clarifying systems or
linkages of command in the perpetration of grave human rights violations.
The decision as to how to balance these conflicting objectives-pursuing
the truth of individual incidents versus systems of abuse-presented con-
stant challenges to the commissioners.
Once an investigation was complete and a decision taken, the TRCK
immediately provided notification of its decision to concerned persons, in-
cluding the petitioners and respondents or their descendants, as well as ref-
21. Id. art. 19(2).
22. Specifically, 7,922 out of the 10,860 petitions submitted to the TRCK in-
volved incidents related to Korean War massacres. TRCK 2009 REPORT, supra note 7,
at 20.
23. According to the Framework Act, the Commission shall reject a petition if it
does not fall within the subject matter of the Commission's investigatory authority, if its
contents are deemed evidently false or ill-founded, or if it contains identical facts to a
previously dismissed petition. See Framework Act, supra note 1, art. 21.
24. Id. art. 22(3).
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erence witnesses, allowing them the opportunity to raise a written
objection.25 These individual decisions and recommendations were then
submitted in a biannual report to the President and National Assembly with
the goal of publicizing the information that was gathered and creating pub-
lic consensus.26 These reports could then provide the basis for further gov-
ernmental policies, including possible reconciliatory or restorative measures
(e.g., admitting past wrongdoing), restoring the honor of the victims, or
taking other steps to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. 27 Indeed,
the TRCK was authorized under the Framework Act to offer specific rec-
ommendations to the government to reinstate the honor of victims and me-
diate reconciliation between confessed perpetrators and their victims, to
revise policies in order to prevent the reoccurrence of any similar atrocities,
and to establish truth-finding research institutes.28
B. Built-In Limitations
Despite the historic nature of the TRCK and its extensive mandate, it
faced multiple limitations in pursuing its mandate to expose the truth of the
past. These limitations grew in large part from the Framework Act's origin
as a political compromise between the conservative and liberal parties in the
National Assembly in May 2005. The conservative Grand National Party
(GNP), which generally represented the offenders' position and interests,
fiercely opposed the bill when it was introduced, and thus the liberal Uri
Party had to agree to the creation of the TRCK with a restricted mandate in
order to secure enough votes to pass the Assembly. In other words, the
conservatives, who had directly or indirectly benefited from the past author-
itarian rule and thus could potentially suffer negative consequences from
the TRCK's work, opposed the Framework Act itself and forced a deep
compromise on the ruling Uri Party. This compromise was likewise re-
flected in the selection and composition of the commissioners.
Like most other truth commissions in the world established after de-
mocratization, the TRCK also had to contend with the fact that many of the
main offenders and perpetrators of the violations being investigated still
occupied important posts in state institutions. The ideology that had been
used to justify the human rights violations, anticommunism, was also still
operative. The influence of past perpetrators who remained in certain power
25. Id. art. 28. Responses to written objections were required to be made within
sixty days of their receipt. Id. art. 28(5).
26. Id. art. 32.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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blocs forced the TRCK to work with a markedly limited mandate and
latitude.
At the same time, despite the fact that the TRCK had the power to
recommend reconciliatory or restorative measures, its recommendations
were not legally binding. It had no authority to punish perpetrators, even
when they were positively identified and their wrongdoing plainly estab-
lished. Nor was it empowered to offer immunity to alleged perpetrators in
exchange for their testimony or confessions, as had been done in the case of
South Africa's TRC. 29 Under this limited legal mandate, the TRCK, after
concluding its investigation, proposed recommendations to rectify damages,
restore honor, and promote reconciliation between victims and offenders.
The recommendations, however, could be rejected by the state institutions
that might hold some responsibility for perpetrating the wrongs of the past,
including grave human rights abuses and massacres. This limitation in the
Framework Act eliminated an important avenue of reconciliation that the
TRCK might have been able to promote.
The mandate and resources of the Commission further curtailed the
character and the quality of the "truth" that the TRCK was expected to
reach. When we define truth with regard to the TRC, it must include the
long-term, structural conditions that often serve as underlying causes for
gross human rights abuse and other related incidents. The number of deaths,
the character of suffering, and the identification of the perpetrators and final
commanders must also be ascertained. The Commission must verify who
did what to whom, when and where, and the causes and consequences of
these events. But the incidents that the TRCK was scheduled to investigate,
from isolated human rights abuses to mass killings from long ago, were too
broad and complex to tackle. Because the Framework Act granted the
TRCK authority only to establish truth in the narrow sense of "forensic
truth," the investigators were ordered to end their work when the minimum
quantity of data was collected to verify the truth of a specific event. At the
same time, although a different method and process should be applied when
investigating massacres during war-time as opposed to human rights abuses
under authoritarian regimes, accommodations to deal with these differences
were not fully reflected in the Framework Act.
29. It was able to recommend that perpetrators who actively cooperated with the
Commission by confessing their crimes during the investigation be granted immunity
from criminal prosecution or investigation, that their punishment be mitigated or that, if
already convicted, that they be pardoned. See id. art. 38(1). State institutions were not,
however, required to follow such recommendations, even though the Framework Act
suggested that they "shall" respect the TRCK's decisions and recommendations. Id. art.
38(2).
[Vol. 19
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The most notable limitation of the TRCK's mandate, however, can be
found in the authority it was granted for investigation. While one of its
main missions was to establish the factual or objective truth about a com-
plaint filed by victims, its investigative authority as a temporary fact-find-
ing body was curtailed by the law, which did not provide conditions to
facilitate victims' testimony. In particular, the Framework Act lacked provi-
sions authorizing the Commission to force perpetrators to testify or to offer
immunity for their testimonies. Accordingly, few veterans have been will-
ing to come forward. Many victims have likewise stayed away, unwilling to
open old wounds between neighbors caught up in the political and ideologi-
cal struggle of decades ago. Indeed, even after democratization, both the
perpetrators of state violence and victims' families have been reluctant to
come forward to speak for both legal and social reasons.
The TRCK, it may be noted, did have the power to summon reference
witnesses. However, if those witnesses refused the summons, the Commis-
sion had limited legal recourse to punish them or compel their coopera-
tion.30 More importantly, the TRCK had no legal power to obtain the
necessary documents from concerned state institutions if those in charge of
the institutions determined that the documents included sensitive material.31
Therefore, relevant state institutions that received a request for documents
from the Commission could reject that request on the grounds of a nebu-
lously defined national security objection. 32 The TRCK was viewed from
the beginning as a nagging or inconvenient organization by the entities that
were allegedly responsible for past human rights violations, including the
Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), the Bureau of Police, and the
Ministry of Defense. The dilemma was that their cooperation and former
30. If the reference witness refuses to appear, the TRC can issue an order of ac-
companying for the person. See id. art. 24. If that order is rejected without reasonable
grounds, the person subject to the warrant of accompanying shall be fined up to
$10,000. Id. art. 47. This enforcement provision is nonetheless largely symbolic on two
levels. On the one hand, perpetrators and reference witnesses may prefer to pay the fine
rather than confess their past misdeeds and live with the corresponding dishonor. On the
other, the TRCK only rarely issued an order of accompanying and never in fact fined
anyone who refused to appear.
31. Although the Framework Act requires that parties receiving requests for
materials for TRCK investigations "should not reject such submission without reasona-
ble ground[s]," it allows an exception where the appropriate minister in charge of the
relevant institution submits an explanation within five days stating that the information
is "classified information regarding the military, diplomacy, or North Korean relations,
and the release of such material would endanger national security." See id. art. 23(8).
32. They would nonetheless be required to submit the requested information to the
TRCK for its exclusive inspection by the commissioners, "provided that the Commis-
sion shall not release the articles or materials to the public." Id. art. 28(9).
2012]
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
agents' testimony were essential for the TRCK to obtain the necessary doc-
uments associated with past wrongdoing in order to conduct investigations.
At the same time, the persistence of strong anticommunist sentiments
combined with the continued presence of ultra-rightists in South Korea has
meant that even this legal mandate was not sufficiently implemented. For
now, Korean citizens remain deeply divided over the group's work. Sev-
enty-seven year old Lee Soon-chang, for example, who had a role in war-
time killings that he feels were justified, complained recently that the
commission vilified the military "while turning Communists into patri-
ots."'33 He explained, "They say these people were executed without trial.
But what trial? It was wartime. '34 Mainstream conservative newspapers oc-
casionally criticized the TRCK's work as a left-leaning plot intended to
impair the legitimacy of South Korean state. 35 Struggling with this type of
unwillingness to cooperate, the TRCK faced the diminishing prospects of
getting a two-year extension, especially after President Roh was replaced by
Lee Myong-bak following a new election.
Therefore, it was not just the TRCK's legal authority per se that em-
powered its work. Political conditions in the society at large facilitated its
work and, indeed, its very existence. The political will of President Roh
Moo-hyun and the strong support from civil society groups forced coopera-
tion from traditionally oppressive Korean institutions. The under-institu-
tionalized, political nature of the TRCK's authority also meant that its
ability to conduct investigations could be radically curtailed by a change in
politics or by a drop in civil society's attention or capacity, which proved to
be the case under President Lee Myong-bak's administration. Ever since its
inauguration in 2008, the Lee Myung-bak administration has sought to
merge and abolish the nation's truth commissions. During the 2007 presi-
dential campaign, members of President Lee's party said the group's activi-
ties threatened social harmony in the South and could strain South Korea's
alliance with the United States. Bills submitted to the National Assembly in
December 2008 by the Grand National Party's Shin Ji-ho and thirteen other
Assembly members proposed combining the functions of the fourteen truth
33. Choe Sang-Hun, Korea Investigates Atrocities in Race against Time, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009.
34. Id. Summary executions were widely conducted by South Korean forces
against suspected communists during the Korean War. They were believed to be inevi-
table and justifiable in the civil war. See DONG-CHOON KIM, THE UNENDING KOREAN
WAR: A SOCIAL HISTORY 143-212 (Sung-ok Kim trans., 2009).
35. See, e.g., Editorial CHOSUN ILBO, Mar. 15, 2007 (arguing that the TRCK's
forthcoming report is destined "to be another Korean history textbook like those written
by leftists before").
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commissions into one Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 36 In view of
the striking differences in the missions, mandates, and work of these organi-
zations, the policy may be understood as a design to block the functioning
of the commissions. The possibility that the TRCK could ultimately survive
still existed. But when the President in 2008 nominated a new chairperson
and commissioners, who were mostly conservative and opposed to the
kinds of activities that had been carried out before, the TRCK was plunged
into disarray. Other state institutions also became uncooperative with the
Commission following these political changes. 37
President Lee Myung-bak's intention to halt the TRCK's work or force
it to merge with other investigative bodies failed. But the new presiden-
tially-appointed chairperson was unwilling to finish the TRCK's work in
accordance with the former chairperson's plan. While the Commission's
leadership from the outset was divided among standing commissioners rep-
resenting liberal and conservative views, the conservatives clearly domi-
nated following the February 2008 inauguration of President Lee Myung-
bak.
The disadvantageous socio-economic conditions when the TRCK was
created must also be considered in assessing its effectiveness. The public's
concern with the work of the TRCK waned with the onset of the economic
crisis of 2008. While some media coverage was generated by the TRCK's
press releases, people generally did not see the kind of intense public out-
rage that accompanied the prosecution in the 1990s of the former presi-
dents, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, for their part in the 1980
Gwangju Massacre. The big three conservative newspapers in Korea,
Chosun Ilbo, Donga Ilbo and Hankook Ilbo, were uniformly hostile and
provided little coverage, except to point out the Commission's errors. Tele-
vision stations, notably KBS and MBC, which were initially favorable to
the Commission during the Roh Moo-hyun presidency, shifted following
the election of Lee Myung-bak and ceased to cover the TRCK's work. Only
the Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang Daily, which represent the progressive me-
dia, consistently followed the Commission's work. 38
These conditions help to explain the Korean public's sense of fatigue
about repeated efforts to uncover the past, a fatigue encouraged by the con-
36. These bills were not passed. They nonetheless intended to abolish all of the
past-dealing commissions still in operation.
37. The police and the National Intelligence Service under the current Lee My-
ung-bak administration are uncooperative, a sharp contrast to the TRCK's work with
them during the previous Roh Mu-hyun administration.
38. For a list of the primary media coverage of the TRCK, see TRCK 2009 RE-
PORT, supra note 7, at 133-37.
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servative press. Ideally documentaries, educational materials, scholarly
publications, artistic and cultural productions should have been created as a
way of coming to terms with the truth of past events uncovered by the
TRCK, but unfortunately that has not occurred.
III. ACHIEVEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The TRCK was tasked with the responsibility of verifying the truth of
the past and thereby fostering reconciliation between the victims and perpe-
trators. In this respect, although the TRCK was successful in documenting a
number of previously hidden atrocities and abuses, it has largely failed to
identify the root causes of those events or to achieve the conditions neces-
sary for reconciliation. In terms of fact-finding, it failed to reveal the final
top-level commander of the Korean War massacres and the fabricated espi-
onage cases. Moreover, since the mandate to punish the responsible parties
for these incidents was denied, it can be said that the TRCK also failed to
build an institutional device to block the recurrence of similar incidents.
Despite these apparent shortcomings, the TRCK has had some signifi-
cant achievements. It succeeded in uncovering some long-concealed truths
and restoring justice, particularly in cases involving the judiciary as the per-
petrator of injustice. Some of the TRCK's findings, based on newly discov-
ered testimony and documents about the human rights abuses and mass
killings committed by South Korean authorities, were notable achievements
in the context of setting the Korean historical record straight for the first
time, especially with regard to the mass killings of National Guidance
League members (Bodo yeonmang), collaborators with North Korea's peo-
ples' committees, political prisoners, and the civilians who served the leftist
guerrillas. 39
The operations of the intelligence organizations and the United States'
bombing of South Korean civilians demand a review of the dominant narra-
tive of Cold War history in Korea since the 1950s. During the Korean War,
some American bombings resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians.40
39. See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, COMPRE-
HENSIVE REPORT, Vol. 1, pt. 1 (2010) [hereinafter TRCK COMPREHENSIVE REPORT].
40. The TRCK found, for example, that in August 1950, sixty-nine civilians were
killed in the Uiryeong region by U.S. bombings. The TRCK also found that between
August 2 and September 26, 1950, civilians in the Haman region of Gyeongnam Prov-
ince were killed by U.S military aerial bombings and strafing fire, and that between
January and February 1950, U.S. Air Force bombings and machine gun assaults killed
at least forty-seven civilians in the Gyeonggi region. Significantly, of the 1,222 inci-
dents classified as massacres by the TRCK,, 215 were found to have been committed by
the United States military. See TRCK 2009 REPORT, supra note 7, at 41. See also
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Nevertheless, these U.S. bombing incidents against innocent South Korean
civilians have never been raised as a political issue, even after the conclu-
sion of the TRCK's work. Under the geopolitical circumstances of the Cold
War in South Korea, where criticizing the U.S. meant running the risk of
being branded a communist or a North Korean sympathizer, discussing or
even mentioning any U.S. war crimes was regarded as "taboo" in Korea.
The appearance of the TRCK was itself a symbolic step toward breaking
the taboo, but much more remains to be done.
Most of the cases of human rights abuse investigated by the Commis-
sion took place during times of political unrest in the 1950s and 60s, after
the May 16th Military Coup (1961), during the Yushin period (1972-79),
and during the 1980s. In particular, in most of the cases that received con-
firmed rulings, the prosecutors and the court acknowledged falsified confes-
sions attained through illegal detention and torture. The espionage
falsification cases in the 1960s and 1980s involved abducted fishermen,
people who crossed into the South from the North, those who had relatives
in North Korea, and the Korean-Japanese.
In addition to truth-finding investigations, exhumation and fieldwork
was conducted through a service contractor to find the necessary evidence
and to build a foundation for reconciliation. The exhumations related to the
illegal massacres from the Korean War were significant in that they were
the first government-led effort in fifty years and represent a response to the
bereaved families' demands for such activities. As the TRCK's 2009 report
documents, "In December 2006, the Commission conducted on-site exami-
nations and field surveys for 168 of the most probable locations of mas-
sacres (14 sites were examined independently by the Commission and 154
sites were examined through subcontracted agencies) and chose 39 sites for
initial excavation. '41 By 2009, exhumations were underway in 13 locations:
Bunteogol and Jigyeonggol in Cheongwon; the cobalt mines in Gyeongsan;
Maegok-dong, Suncheon in Jeonnam Province; Galmyeongdo, Gujado-ri,
Uisin-myeon in Jindo; and Won-ri and Oegong-ri in Sicheon-myeon,
Sancheong-gun, Gyeongnam Province. 42
Charles J. Hanley, No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths, 42 CRITICAL
ASIAN STUD. 589 (2010); Suh Hee-Kyung, Atrocities Before and During the Korean
War: Civilian Killings by South Korean & U.S. Forces, 42 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 553
(2010); Kim Tae-woo, A Study of the Aerial Bombing by the United States Air Force
During the Korean war (2008) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Seoul National University).
41. TRCK 2009 REPORT, supra note 7, at 35-36.
42. See id. at 35-38. Beginning with Bongseong Mountain in Gurye, Jeonnam
Province in June 2007, a total of approximately 400 bodies were found, and in the
cobalt mines in Gyeongsan Province, 240 bodies and 1,085 artifacts, including bullet
casings, seals, and nametags were discovered. In addition, 110 bodies were found at
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Based on these findings, the TRCK made a number of non-binding
recommendations to the South Korean government. These were, in the
TRCK's words, expected to "contribute greatly to national solidarity and
the growth of democracy by restoring the honor of the victims and their
families, preventing reoccurrences, and fostering reconciliation between the
offenders and victims. ' 43 The TRCK's recommendations, made with re-
spect to each petition it decided, included "official state apologies, correc-
tion of the Family Registry, reexamination, memorial services, the
correction of historical records, archiving of historical files, legislation for
relief of damages, restoration of damages, peace and human rights educa-
tion, indemnity of damages, and treatment of aftereffects. ''44 Ultimately, the
TRCK made 8,691 separate recommendations based on individual incidents
in addition to a set of comprehensive recommendations before finishing its'
mission in December 2010. 45
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
To ensure that the TRCK's recommendations were properly executed,
a Recommendations Follow-Up Board was established in 2007 under the
Office of the Prime Minister.46 In 2008 this institution was incorporated into
the Ministry of Public Administration and Security following a cabinet re-
organization. The Recommendations Follow-Up Board is mandated to help
implement the recommendations the TRCK issues under article 34 of the
Framework Act. That provision requires the State to endeavor to repair in-
juries and restore the honor of victims, "to take measures of appropriate
legal/political reconciliation, and to take necessary measures to reconcile
and unify the nation. '47 At the same time, a Reconciliation Committee was
established within the TRCK on June 19, 2007 "to administer reconciliation
and memorial efforts, establish a road-map for settling the past, investigate
psychological damages and development of review programs for reconcilia-
Cheongwon Bunteogol; 34 bodies were found at Gollyeonggol in Daejeon; and 13 bod-
ies were found at Bongseong Mountain in Gurye. Id.
43. Id. at 106.
44. Id. at 107.
45. See TRCK COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 39, at 199; Final Recommen-
dations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea, 19 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 77 (2012) (Mark Nathan & Eon Joo Park, trans.) [hereinafter TRCK Final
Recommendations].
46. Regulations on the Establishment and Operation of the Recommendations Fol-
low-Up Board, Presidential Decree No. 195, Aug. 27, 2007.
47. Framework Act, supra note 1, art. 34.
[Vol. 19
TRCK Overview and Assessment
tion, and to search for methods to improve recommendations for each indi-
vidual case." 48
Despite the creation of these new institutions, implementation of the
TRCK's recommendations has been slow and highly uneven. Relatively
easy measures, such the correction of the Family Registry, have largely
been accepted and implemented, but politically sensitive or financially bur-
densome recommendations remain untouched: revision of historical
records, legislation for relief of damages, compensation of damages, and
peace and human rights education. Given the lack of administrative and
political will since Lee Myung-bak's inauguration, certain crucial recom-
mendations, including apology of the responsible governmental bureaus, re-
lief of damages, and revision of historical records, have never even been
considered by government for possible implementation. This inaction has
been enabled by the TRCK's weak mandate to force implementation of the
recommendations. The following sections discuss what has been done to
date to implement the TRCK's various recommendations.
A. Recovering the Dignity of the Victims
Most of the Korean War-related victims' suffering came from the dis-
criminatory treatment they or their families experienced as second-class cit-
izens after being branded as 'traitors' or anti-state criminals. In some cases
their property was confiscated or their educational opportunities were
blocked, while in other cases people were ostracized as "Reds." For thirty
to forty years after the Korean War, these survivors and their family mem-
bers suffered as a result of guilt-by-association. The official investigation
and decision by the Commission was approximately equivalent to the rec-
ognition that the victims were killed by authorities without legal grounds.
Those who were victimized by false espionage charges or grave human
rights violations also recovered their human dignity by the TRCK's fact-
finding and conclusions, which established that they were fabricated as es-
pionage by illegal torture or detention.
While the TRCK's reports provided official confirmation of illegal
killings, other steps were needed to fulfill the objectives of recovering the
victims' full dignity: governmental acknowledgment, apology, new deci-
sions by courts, rewriting history textbooks, and the like. Among these,
some measures have been implemented. When a case was resolved, the
TRCK organized an official memorial service involving the bereaved,
48. TRCK 2009 REPORT, supra note 7, at 107.
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which was held at the county seat.49 Memorial ceremonies funded by the
government were tantamount to the government's official recognition of the
regrettable deaths. In addition to these efforts, the chairperson, standing
commissioners, and members of the Commission consoled the victims'
families by participating in joint regional memorial and prayer services in
Jeju, Hampyeong, Goyang, Yeosu, Mungyeong, Ulsan, Sancheong,
Gochang, Gyeongsan, Haenam, and Ganghwa.5
0
Such services have been conducted with the involvement of the Gover-
nor, the local military commander, the local police chief and other officials,
together with the victims' families. In addition, a monument was erected to
consecrate the victims. But the type of action taken depended very much on
the political circumstances of the region where the atrocities or abuses oc-
curred. In areas such as Jeolla, where more than a third of the petitions
submitted to the TRCK originated and where local politics were supportive
of the TRCK's activities, the victims have recovered their dignity through
these types of official ceremony. But in areas like Gyeongsang where local
leaders are generally hostile to the Commission's work, the effectiveness
has been quite limited.
The most important results in terms of recovering the dignity of the
victims have been seen in the changing views regarding past tragedies that
have occurred in many local communities and neighborhoods. These chang-
ing views have assisted victims' families in feeling that their "full-citizen-
ship" has been restored. This was partly a result of the fact that local media
often covered the TRCK's findings extensively regarding past government
wrongdoings and the pent-up grievances of victims.
B. Official State Apology
Following the TRCK's recommendation, President Roh Mu-hyun pub-
lically apologized for the government's illegal exercise of state power dur-
ing the Korean War.51 On January 24, 2008, President Roh expressed the
49. See Kim Dong Choon & Mark Selden, South Korea's Embattled Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN Focus (Mar. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Kim-Dong_choon/3313.
50. See Newsletter Issue 8, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC
OF KOREA, Sept. 30, 2009, available at http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/Information/
general/news_08/news_08.asp.
51. President Roh Mu-hyun officially apologized for the abuses perpetrated by the
previous government and expressed his condolences to the Jeju April 3 victims. The
report changed the existing name of the incident, April 3 Jeju Rebellion Incident, to the
Jeju April 3 Incident. This change has raised serious disputes over which name should
be used. The Korean government's official recognition of the existence of the Jeju April
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government's position regarding the settlement of historical issues and of-
fered an official comprehensive apology regarding the illegal exercise of
power by past regimes in accordance with the TRCK's recommendation.
Through a videotaped message, President Roh made an official apology to
the victims and the bereaved families of the Ulsan National Guidance
League massacre, although he extended his apology to all Korean War vic-
tims. In his words:
I also offer words of apology to all victims, including their families,
who were abused by state power. We should take this as a lesson so
as to prevent this kind of incident from happening again.52
This apology might constitute a signal of responding to the work of
TRCK, which was created through his political will at the special proclama-
tion in August 15, 2004. However, other concerned government officials
did not follow the President's lead. The head of the KCIA intelligence ser-
vice, the National Police Chief and the Secretary of Defense never issued
any official apologies concerning the wrongs committed by those institu-
tions. Their inaction meant that those state organizations did not fully ac-
cept the TRCK's decision nor even acknowledge its new findings of state
atrocities.
Instead of issuing official apologies, they sent their local commanders
to the memorial services as a minimum expression of condolence. Some-
times, however, local officials have demonstrated remorse or offered apolo-
gies. For the Goyang Geumjeong Cave and Naju Dongbakguljae cases, the
local police commissioner and police chiefs participated in the memorial
services and expressed deep regret. At other memorial services, local mili-
tary commanders participated and also expressed their regrets.
C. Reexamination in Court
The TRCK made a number of recommendations to the government
concerning the review of trials in which rulings were made based on the
Emergency Measures instituted under the Park Chung Hee's Yushin regime
(1972-1979).53 In addition, it recommended separate legislative measures to
resolve past human rights infringements brought about by the Yushin Re-
3 Incident's civilian victims is a crucial step on the road of historical settlement of
Korean War massacres.
52. TRCK 2009 REPORT, supra note 7, at 108.
53. The Yushin Regime, the final era of the Park Presidency, was notorious for
oppressing dissidents and committing grave human rights violations, torture, espionage-
fabrication and disappearance of main political opponents. The Emergency Measures
functioned as all-mighty laws in oppressing the dissidents.
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gime. Finally, in reviewing a newly tried case, Korea's Supreme Court de-
termined in 2010 that the Emergency Measures were unconstitutional, a
ruling that symbolizes a key act of restitution for those victimized under the
Emergency Measures. 54
The Korean courts have re-examined and ultimately reversed the origi-
nal decisions in several controversial petitions on human rights abuses that
the TRCK had verified. The courts have generally accepted the TRCK's
investigation as trustworthy findings. In about twenty cases, after retrials,
the courts have delivered findings declaring people's innocence, ordering
that charges be dropped, and awarding compensation to the petitioners.
5 5
For example, in January 2008, the Commission referred the case of Jo
Yong-su, a newspaper editor of the daily Minjok Ilbo who was summarily
executed in 1961 on charges of treason, to the courts, asking for a retrial.
56
Consequently, forty-seven years after his trial and execution, Jo was found
innocent in a court of law. 57 Thus far, the Korean courts have consistently
54. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Do5986, Dec. 16, 2010. This decision,
reached on December 17, 2010, was grounded directly in the TRCK's finding that the
use of the "Emergency Measures" by Park Chung-hee's administration in the 1970s
constituted a grave infringement of citizens' constitutionally guaranteed basic rights.
This finding marked the first time a state commission had stated that all of the Emer-
gency Measures represented the illegal and improper exercise of public authority. See
State Commission Finds all Emergency Measures Violated Basic Rights: Truth and
Reconciliation Commission Pushes for a Constitutional Court Ruling on Park Chung-
hee Administration's Emergency Measures, THE HANKYOREH Sept. 2, 2009, available
at http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english-edition/e_national/374461.html.
55. By July of 2010, the TRCK had recommended forty-two cases to the courts
for re-examination. The most well-known of these cases is that of Gang Ki-Hoon. In
2007, all charges were dropped against Gang Ki-hoon after sixteen years, three years of
which he had spent in prison. He had been charged under the government of former
President Roh Tae Woo in 1991 with forging the will and testament of his friend and
fellow activist, Kim Ki-sul (who burned himself to death in May of that year in protest
against the military government). The Roh Tae Woo government alleged that activists
were encouraging people to kill themselves and were even prepared to ghost write their
wills, with the case developing into a Korean version of the Dreyfus affair. It ended
only in 2007 with the release of the results of a fresh investigation by the National
Institute of Scientific Investigation, or NISI, confirming that the will had indeed been
written by Kim. See generally Gavan McCormack & Kim Dong-Choon, Grappling with
Cold War History: Korea's Embattled Truth and Reconciliation Commission, ASIA-
PACIFIC J.: JAPAN Focus (Feb. 21, 2009), available at http://japanfocus.org/-Kim-Dong
_choon/3056.
56. See generally TRCK 2009 REPORT, supra note 7, at 100 (referencing case,
verified by Commission on Nov. 28, 2006).
57. Editorial, The Historic Acquittal of Jo Yong-su, THE HANKYOREH, Jan. 17,
2008, available at http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english-edition/eeditorial/263784.html.
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accepted the results of the TRCK's findings as true and have reversed nu-
merous past decisions. South Korea's Supreme Court also acquitted a left-
leaning party leader who was charged with subversion and espionage, fifty-
one years after he was executed by South Korea's first president, Syngman
Rhee.58 The case was reopened after the TRCK concluded in 2007 that it
was based on flimsy evidence and flawed testimony.59
Many newly verified incidents by the TRCK are now under the re-
examination process in the courts.
D. Restorative Measures and Compensation for Victims
On August 21, 2009, the TRCK officially recommended that the gov-
ernment should enact a special law for compensating victims of civilian
massacres, including payment of medical bills in cases where mass victimi-
zation was verified. 60 However, the National Assembly and Lee Myung-bak
government have ignored this recommendation.
As noted above, the reexamination by courts of human rights violation
cases has been relatively successful. Nevertheless, there has been some con-
troversy over the desirability of re-examining all such cases one by one.
The TRCK recommended that some human rights violation cases, such as
those involving the application of the Emergency Measures between 1974
and 1979, should be settled by a decision of the Constitutional Court on the
Measures' constitutionality. 61 It has thus suggested that the Emergency
Measure cases can be solved by nullifying the law, much the same way
Germany carried out the de-Nazification process.62
Recently, Korean War-related victims received welcome news from
the South Korean Supreme Court. It reversed the lower court's decision on
the Ulsan's National Guidance League (Bodo yeonmang) case, stipulating
that the government must not apply the statute of limitations to the victims
58. See Editorial, Cho Bong-am and Judicial Homicide, THE HANKYOREH, Jan.
21, 2011, available at http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english-edition/e_editorial/459921.
html.
59. See TRCK 2009 REPORT, supra note 7, at 98 (referencing Jo Bong-am case).
60. See TRCK COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 39, at 35; TRCK Final Rec-
ommendations, supra note 45, at 85-86.
61. See Human Rights Abuses by the Emergency Decreesof the Yushin, TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Sept. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.j insil.go.kr/English/Information/notice/read.asp?num=442&pageno= 1 &
stype=title&sval=human%20rights&data-years=2012&data month=.
62. See Lee Jae-Seung, The Korean National Assembly Must Settle the Tie of the
Emergency Measures, THE HANKYOREH, Feb. 1, 2007.
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or their family's petitions for compensation. 63 This decision may affect
other pending trials in higher courts. But these separate trials also raise
doubts about the reparatory measures and whether they should be resolved
through individual lawsuits filed by victims. It might be much more effi-
cient and effective to conduct a large, comprehensive administrative pro-
cess. Indeed, the necessity for enacting a special law for compensating all
Korean War related victims has only grown clearer with these recent judi-
cial developments.
E. Reconciliation for Communities
With respect to "reconciliation," the TRCK has accomplished little of
note because neither a single perpetrator nor any responsible state institu-
tions has ever apologized for past misdeeds. The TRCK has been less suc-
cessful in those objectives than in verifying the facts of specific incidents
primarily because it is not empowered to take any measures, beyond mak-
ing nonbinding recommendations, against individuals or institutions that re-
fuse or fail to fully comply with its recommendations. In order for Korean
society to achieve true reconciliation, those institutions most responsible for
human rights violations, specifically the KCIA, Ministry of Defense, and
the National Police, must officially and openly acknowledge their misdeeds
and ask for forgiveness from the victims. Nonetheless, the persistence of
Cold War politics in South Korea has allowed these institutions to avoid
acknowledging their misdeeds.
The Korean War and state terrorism plunged many villages across the
country into ideological strife and mutual distrust. In order for reconcilia-
tion to occur, social healing must take place within communities, a process
that the government must sponsor or encourage. The work of villagers in
Gurim, where about 300 people were killed in the months leading up to the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, provides an important model of what
might be encouraged. There, long before the appearance of TRCK, villagers
initiated the process of healing by holding a joint mourning service for all
those killed on both sides of the war's divide and by raising money for a
memorial .64
63. See Kim Rahn, Compensation Claim Period Limitless for Inhumane State
Crimes, THE KOREA TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
nation/2011/09/117_94525.html.
64. See Choe Sang-Hun, From a Brutal Past, a South Korean Village Strives for
Reconciliation, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 17, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
02/17/world/asia/I 7iht-village.2. 1011 3473.html ?pagewanted=al1.
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F. Publicization of TRCK's Findings and Recommendations
Although the TRCK's official report and documents are important to
recover the dignity of victims and their family members, it is also impera-
tive to reveal this history to Korean citizens through public education in
order to begin healing society's ills. Under the pressure of dealing with
victim petitions, the TRCK had little time or budget to publicize its find-
ings. The conservative media, for its part, has almost completely ignored
the new facts and documents that the TRCK uncovered and released, choos-
ing instead to reinforce the official versions of history that have been put
forward in the past. As a result, the TRCK's work has attracted little atten-
tion from ordinary Koreans and has left much to be done in publicizing its
findings and achievements.
At the same time, the situation has deteriorated in important respects.
The Lee Myung-bak government has gone so far as to assert that some
current history textbooks are so liberal or left-oriented that they should be
revised. In response, Korea's ministry of education released updated author-
ization standards for new textbooks, in which a description of the Gwangju
5.18 democracy movement was omitted. 65 In this environment, the newly
discovered historical truths of the TRCK have had little chance to be publi-
cized in readable form.
Applicable laws and systems must therefore be supplemented so that
all documented reports from the TRCK's investigations can be systemati-
cally categorized, filed, and stored at an archival institute independent from
the National Archives. The existing documents have been moved to the
National Archives and are now being processed. These special documents
must nonetheless be preserved in separate institutions as well so that the
peoples' right to know can be fulfilled.
G. Settlement of U.S. -Related Incidents
A large number of U.S.-related incidents remain unresolved. In 2001,
before the establishment of the TRCK, the Pentagon acknowledged that
American soldiers shot and killed unarmed civilians near the South Korean
hamlet of No Gun Ri in 1950.66 However, the official report attributed the
deaths to confusion and even fear on the part of the soldiers rather than to
an order to fire upon refugees. This was the U.S. government's reason for
65. See Editorial, Depoliticizing History Textbooks, The Hankyoreh Nov. 19,
2011, available at http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english-edition/eeditorial/506208.html.
66. See Norman Kempster, Clinton 'Regrets,' Doesn't Apologize for, No Gun Ri,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2001/janI12/news/
mn- 1517.
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rejecting the No Gun Ri survivors' demand for an apology and compensa-
tion based on the report by the joint investigation with its Korean counter-
part, which decided that the No Gun Ri Killings were not 'deliberate' or
carried out under orders. 67
The TRCK has also uncovered many cases of civilian massacres com-
mitted by American forces during the Korean War, and it recommended
that the South Korean government negotiate their settlement with the
United States. 68 The American government must conduct additional investi-
gations and provide redress concerning such crimes. The TRCK's recom-
mendations correspondingly included the need for an official state apology
and the holding of a memorial event, as well as measures to compensate the
victims through negotiations with the U.S. government. 69 However, the
TRCK did not receive any answer from either the South Korean or the U.S.
government. The primary responsibility to press the issue lies with the Ko-
rean government, but it appears that Korea's Ministry of Defense might
never convey the recommendation to the U.S. government. In an interview
with the New York Times, Lt. Col. Almarah Belk, a Pentagon spokeswoman
in Washington, said she did not "have any information on investigations
into new findings as it relates to deaths of Koreans during the Korean War
by U.S. military action. '70 The U.S. Embassy has stated that no government
agencies or officials in Seoul had approached it concerning compensation
for victims. 71 Spokesman Aron Taver also said that the Embassy had not
been monitoring the Commission's findings. 72
Absent an official request from the Korean government, the U.S. gov-
ernment may feel no need to respond to the TRCK's findings and recom-
67. American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz has said that the No Gun Ri report
omitted the declassified letter of Ambassador Muccio, which referenced a policy deci-
sion taken at the high-level U.S.-South Korean meeting regarding permission to fire on
refugees. See Sahr Conway-Lanz, Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States
Military in the Korean War, 29 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 49 (2005). In its 2001 report, the
U.S investigation team said it had learned of the other civilian killings by U.S forces,
but it indicated that they would not be investigated. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
INSPECTOR GENERAL, No GUN Ri REVIEW (2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/news
hour/media/nogunri/summary.pdf.
68. TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 45, at 86.
69. See id.
70. Choe Sang-Hun, Unearthing War's Horrors Years Later in South Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/world/asia/03
korea.html?pagewanted=all.
71. See Charles J. Hanley & Jae-Soon Chang, Commission Seeks U.S. Compensa-
tion for War Crimes, THE SUN, Aug. 4, 2008, available at http://www.nysun.com/for-
eigncommission-seeks-us-compensation-for-war-crimes/83083/.
72. See id.
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mendations. To achieve truth and reconciliation, however, the U.S.
government must address this issue by responding to an official request,
and the South Korean and U.S. governments should establish a joint investi-
gation team to fully resolve this problem.7 3
H. Exhumations and National Memorial Sites for Burial
Korea also needs to plan the enshrinement of victims' remains and
future exhumation work by issuing applicable regulations or laws and by
securing the necessary finance and procurement measures. 74 For a period of
six months starting from December 2006, the TRCK investigated an esti-
mated 154 burial grounds scattered across the nation, and immediately be-
gan exhumations at thirty-nine locations. During its time, the TRCK could
only exhume about twenty percent of the probable sites, focusing on those
that were expected to be the largest burial sites. It was hampered, however,
even with respect to some of the most probable sites, like Daegon, given its
lack of legal authority to conduct exhumations on private property.
In order to sustain the exhumation of the remaining sites, the legal
groundwork must be prepared. This will depend both on favorable public
opinion and the political will of government. The TRCK also recommended
that the National Assembly and the government enact a special law mandat-
ing exhumation of all remaining burial grounds and establishing permanent
burial sites, 75 but no response from the authorities concerning this recom-
mendation has been received to date.
I. Preventative Measures and Education
Some say that no measures short of punishment are effective in
preventing the possible recurrence of state violence, but in the process of
enacting the Framework Act it was generally assumed that any move to
enact a special law to prosecute individuals for these atrocities was likely to
set off strong protests among conservatives in Korea. Any such law would
also require the removal of the statute of limitations on human rights cases,
which the current majority of Korean lawmakers is opposed to abolishing.
The probability of punishing perpetrators may thus depend on future politi-
73. There is an outcry of U.S-related victims. See Ashley Rowland & Yoo Kyong
Chang, Former Residents of Island Seek Reparations for Incheon Assault, STARS AND
STRIPES, Apr. 23, 2011, available at http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/korea/former-
residents-of-island-seek-reparations-for-incheon-assault- 1.141782.
74. See TRCK Final Recommendations, supra note 45, at 83.
75. Id.
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cal transformation and the strength of people's supportive opinion on this
issue.
At the same time, changes in the law are crucial. The majority of peti-
tions submitted to the Commission involved illegal acts conducted by state
power. These illegal acts have long been legitimized in the name of an-
ticommunism under such laws as the National Security Act. Such laws must
be reformed or abolished in order to prevent further state violence. Strong
public abolitionist movements to this end emerged in the 1990s under the
Roh Moo-hyun government, but eventually failed under stalwart conserva-
tive party opposition.
It is therefore critical to prepare appropriate judicial reforms to prevent
the reoccurrence of similar incidents in the future, and to reform the na-
tion's laws that justify abusive state power on grounds of anticommunism.
At the same time, educational measures must be taken to spread awareness
of the Commission's work so as to foster an accurate understanding of the
past.
J. Permanent Foundation for Research, Education and Memory
As suggested in the Framework Act, a permanent memorial and re-
search foundation should be established for the purpose of continuing to
memorialize and clear up past incidents, especially through research and
education.7 6 Nonetheless, no progress has been made with regard to estab-
lishing memorials and monuments, establishing and managing the memorial
archives, and completing the overall plan to found a research center to
house the archives and preserve the historical legacies introduced through
the TRCK's findings.
K. Establishing a Healing Center for Suffering Victims
The TRCK was not able to investigate how many of the victims or
their families are still suffering from physical or psychological problems
caused by state violence. The TRCK conducted a study on such problems
by collecting information on 514 people who petitioned the TRCK. It has
been reported that 38.9 percent of the massacre-related victims and 48.8
percent of the human right violation related victims suffered from PTSD
symptoms. 77 Therefore, a government administered healing center should
be established for those victims.
76. Framework Act, supra note 1, art. 40.
77. TRCK COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 39, at 156-57.
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V. LESSONS AND NEXT STEPS
The TRCK closed its doors in December 2010 without seeing its rec-
ommendations fully implemented. Most petitioners, especially the families
of victims who died in massacres, feel relieved that the TRCK has finally
paid attention to their grievances for the first time in Korean history. The
TRCK's investigation and the judiciary's acknowledgement, not to mention
its awarding of compensation to the victims or their families, have gone a
long way toward promoting reconciliation between the state and its victims.
Unfortunately, the nonbinding recommendations that the TRCK gave to
other concerned governmental organizations faced opposition and have not
been sufficiently implemented. Faced with an unfavourable political envi-
ronment after 2008, the TRCK could only carry out its minimal function of
investigating all cases for which it had received petitions.
The TRCK experience offers many lessons, even as its implementation
process continues. The most important of these is perhaps that political sup-
port for transitional processes is variable and must be taken into considera-
tion when undertaking reconciliation efforts. Since the inauguration of the
conservative President Lee Myung-bak in 2008, concerns for justice and
human rights, which constituted the dominant discourse in the prior liberal
administrations of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Mu-hyun and which provided a
facilitating environment for the TRCK's establishment and operation, have
faced challenges from the rise of neoliberal discourse and a new
authoritarianism.
Within this context, many Koreans have raised daunting question
about whether the TRCK contributed to preventing the recurrence of human
rights abuses or achieving judicial justice. Many also doubt the effective-
ness of any organization that has no mandate to punish perpetrators. The
effectiveness of the TRCK must thus continue to be studied closely as the
implementation process proceeds. At the same time, in watching the new
government's nullification of the TRCK's past-dealing project, it has be-
come apparent that government-sponsored justice can face serious distor-
tions. Indeed, there is the perverse possibility that a state-led justice
initiative may re-legitimate state apparatuses and their authority. As such,
the final goal of Truth Commissions should be empowering civil society to
take forward the justice project. This can be done by revising the laws,
ideologies and institutions that have enabled human rights violations in the
past. It will also require the establishment of permanent foundation that can
carry forward the Commission's work. In this way, the TRCK's work
should be connected to continuous political change that may bring about a
more advanced stage of justice, with the TRCK seen as part of a long strug-
gle for justice, not its end. As Yoneyama argues, the "insufficiency of the
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TRC's mission demands not just a single but rather ceaseless regime
change." 78
In the face of such challenges, civic groups and organizations of be-
reaved families have already taken steps to move beyond relying exclu-
sively on governmental institutions for historical redress. They are poised to
emerge yet again as the leading force for past-dealing activities in their ever
successful but never complete quest for truth and reconciliation. Korea's
efforts to realize "the transformative potential of historical redress" thus
continue.7 9
The South Korean government can nevertheless take several specific
measures to help ensure the TRCK's efforts meet with lasting success. Per-
haps most importantly, it should revise the Framework Act to give victims
another opportunity to bring petitions for investigation and historical clarifi-
cation. In the year statutorily allowed for such purposes by the original act,
about ten thousand petitions were submitted and investigated by the TRCK.
It is nonetheless reasonable to presume that many of the wartime victims
were reluctant to apply because of the long-held fear of additional reprisals
from the government. This would mean an extension of the TRCK's inves-
tigative mandate or the creation of a permanent post in government that
would serve the same function.
At the same time, the South Korean government should authorize com-
pensation and other restorative measures for citizens, such as official apolo-
gies by the heads of key government bureaucracies and other forms of
assistance for suffering victims. Incidents of abuse by U.S. forces, insuffi-
ciently investigated by the TRCK, should also be addressed. Finally, the
government must establish mechanisms for broadly disseminating and pre-
serving information on the history of human rights abuses in Korea. In sum,
much remains to be done and it will not be easy to accomplish.
78. Lisa Yoneyama, Politicizing Justice: Post-Cold War Redress and the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, 42 CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIES 653 (2010).
79. Id.
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